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Civil Religion, Fundamentalism , 
and the Politics and Policies of 
George W. Bush 
Manfre d Brocker 
University of Cologne, Germany 
Countl ess observers , especially in Europe , tend to view 
the politics of George W. Bush as being strongly inspired 
by Christian "fundamentalism" and powered by "mis-
sionary " zeal . This article examines the justice of such 
an assessment. It comes to a different conclusion , argu-
ing that in his speeches , the current President of the 
Unit ed States mostly uses "civil religious " metaphors 
and images, but rarely those of Christian denominations ; 
that he only adopts the domestic policy agenda of his 
party 's Christian Right wing where this seems expedient 
on electoral grounds ; and that his foreign policy is based 
on American security interests, and not on any "funda-
mentalist" dogmas . 
When the preparations for military intervention in Iraq were in full swing, many church leaders in Europe were heard to voice criticism of the course taken by 
the US government. The head of the Protestant Church in Ger-
many, Manfred Kock, described President George W. Bush as a 
"religious fundamentalist" who gave the impression of believing 
he had a religious mission to fulfill. "This kind ofrationale," said 
Kock, "makes me terribly afraid."1 The President of the Protes-
tant Church in Hesse and Nassau, Peter Steinacker, viewed US 
policy as an amalgamation of the battle against terrorism and a 
1 Frankfurter Allgemeine 'Zeitung, 3 February 2003, p. 6. 
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striving for hegemony that was ultimately motivated by religious 
grounds, saying 
America bas for some considerable time shown a religious 
tendency to divide the existing world into 'good' and 'evi l' 
regions, nations or systems, as a consequence of its escbato-
logical mission. America maintains this self-image across 
the boundaries of all faiths and all religions, and perceives 
the thousand-year kingdom of the Apocalypse of John that is 
set to dawn with its experiment as the historico-theological 
task of fighting evil on a mission of global politics, and 
promoting freedom and progress throughout the world . 
Since the end of the Cold War, this self-image has consoli-
dated into a renewed striving for hegemony. 
President Bush, continued Steinacker, pursues this route with 
"enthusiastic support from the fundamentalism of evangelical 
groups, principally in the South of the United States."2 
These views were publicly affirmed by individual politicians 
in the German Christian Democratic Union such as Heiner 
Geissler, who described Bush as a "Christian Ayatollah."3 
These and other characterizations of the US President as a 
"crusader" pursuing a "mission of salvation," were heard in-
creasingly in Europe from representatives of the churches, politi-
cians, and intellectuals during the war in Iraq. Bush's statements 
are also occasionally interpreted thus in the US: In November 
2003, Joan Didion published an essay in the New York Revie w of 
Books claiming that the hidden agenda of Bush's policies can be 
found in the apocalyptic "Left Behind" novels by Timothy La-
2 Steinacker, Peter . 2003 . "God's own country . Auch religiOse Differenzen verbreitern die 
Kluft zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und Europa." Frankfurte r Rund -
schau online, January 21 . 
3Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 February 2003, p. 6. 
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Haye and Jerry B. Jenkins. 4 Didion and others impute a dimen-
sion to George W. Bush's policies ( on Iraq) that is ultimately a 
religious one and can be described as "fundamentalist." This es-
say examines the grounds for such evaluations against the back-
drop of the special relationship between politics and religion in 
the USA and the role played by the 'fundamentalist' "Christian 
Right" in US domestic and foreign policy. 
Patriotism and Missionary Zeal in the US 
It was the Puritans, the first settlers in the early seventeenth 
century, who originally furnished the Biblical rhetoric still used 
today in the US to characterize the "American myth," and ap-
plied by Americans chiefly in times of crisis; America is de-
scribed as the land of "hope" and "glory," as "God's own 
country," for which everything will tum out well both now and 
in the future (Bercovitch 1983). 
To the colonists, the journey to America was neither emigra-
tion nor flight, but a "pilgrimage" and a prophetic event. Devout 
Christians, called by God to a historic "mission," set out to found 
the "city on the hill" on the shores of the New World. This rheto-
ric fulfilled the function of portraying the theft of the native In-
dian peoples' territory as nothing more than the appropriation of 
land already promised, and of weakening the immigrants' ties of 
genealogy and national history in favor of a specifically "Ameri-
can" identity. The settlers were no mere European emigrants, but 
the New People of Israel, and America was not a European col-
ony, but the Promised Land of Canaan. No underlings of an aris-
tocracy, these free and equal citizens submitted only to the 
authority of God; they were confident of God's mercy since he 
4 Didion, Joan. "Mr . Bush and the Divine ." New York Review of Books 50/17, 6 Novem-
ber 2003. See also Jennifer Loven, "Bush Increasing Religious Allusions ," Associated 
Press, 18 February 2003. 
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demonstrably blessed their actions. They perceive d their venture 
as an "errand into the wilderness," the fulfillment of the task of 
establishing the ''New Jerusalem" in still "wild" and boundless 
territory, that was interpreted from the outset as a moral and 
spiritual , rather than a geographical, venture, a viewpoint that 
simplified its cross-border scale: first America, later to be known 
as the "United States," then the world. 
In the nineteenth century, the "errand into the wilderness" be-
came America's "manifest destiny," appointed by Providence "to 
manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles, to estab-
lish on earth the noblest temple ever dedicated to the worship of 
the Most High-The Sacred and the True" (John L. O'Su llivan, 
1839; quoted from Kuhnel 1996, 454). The ''New Nation" had 
been entrusted with a superhistorical 'truth': the concepts of 
' freedom' and 'self government,' upon the realization and im-
plementation of which-according to the country's self-image-
the salvation of humanity depended. This idea initially furnished 
legitimacy for the expansion westward, and subsequently-i n the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-for American im-
perialism. The conviction of setting an example to the world 
gave rise to the right, indeed the duty, to reshape that world in 
compliance with this exemplary role. In his April 1917 declara-
tion of war against Germany, President Woodrow Wilson justi-
fied the involvement as "an act of high principle and idealism" 
and "a crusade to make the world safe for democracy."5 The 
American understanding of freedom and democracy was if pos-
sible to be shared among all the peoples of the world . The origi-
nal concept of a religious mission was thus transformed into a 
missionary zeal for democracy. 
5 Interesting parallels might be drawn between the foreign policies of Woodrow Wilson 
and George W. Bush-a task, however, that cannot be undertaken here. 
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Civil Religion 
This having been said, we should not assume that early Amer-
ica was ruled by a homogeneous, or even monolithic, culture that 
united its immigrants into a single nation. On the contrary, from 
the outset American society was strongly fragmented (with re-
spect to regional, ethnic, social, and religious differences), and 
this fragmentation grew as the centuries passed. The ties that 
bound this disparate society were initially comprised of a narrow 
band of commercial exchange and the free traffic of goods, 
which triggered a rapid rise in national income. However, a fur-
ther and primary social tie was the conglomerate of ideas, atti-
tudes, and behaviors so impressively described by Alexis de 
Tocqueville at the start of the nineteenth century. Despite their 
many differences, including religious ones, the inhabitants de-
monstrably shared a common 'doctrine,' known as "civil relig-
ion" or the "American creed" (Myrdal 1944, 3). 
"Civil religion"6 is the term denoting a collection of beliefs, 
symbols, and rituals that bind citizens to a political community 
and ultimately permits the claim of religious legitimacy to be 
raised by that community, its institutions, and representatives. 
This collection of beliefs publicly identifies and acknowledges 
within the political system those elements that in principle men 
are not free to change. It also links the nation's history and its 
destiny in a meaningful and publicly communicated relationship 
(Ltibbe 1981, 56). Civil religion empowers citizens to view their 
political community in a specific light, and articulates the vision 
that unites the nation into an integrated whole (Pierard 1996, 
158). It is concerned with the "civitas terrena," not the "civitas 
dei" (Marty 1986). American civil religion thus stands not for 
6 On (American) civil religion , see particularly: Bellah 1967; Richey/Jones 1974; Marty 
1986; Wald 1997, 59-7 2; Maier 1998. 
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diluted Puritanism or Protestantism, but for an independent con-
sensus of values guaranteeing the solidarity and stability of its 
highly disparate, strongly fragmented society-a task which no 
one faith or religion could have fulfilled. If, say, Protestantism in 
the eighteenth century had been granted legal privileges or even 
been elevated to the status of national religion, sooner or later 
this would have resulted in the breakdown of a society that in-
creasingly numbered not only non-Protestants, non-Christians 
and non-believers, but also hundreds of Protestant churches and 
sects that would probably never have found a consensus over the 
content of a common "national religion." 
It is thus no coincidence that American civil religion adopts a 
strict separation of church and state (Levy 1994), a stricter sepa-
ration even than that found in Europe's most widely secularized 
countries today. To this day, state aid for religions and favoritism 
of a specific faith are prohibited by the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution which-according to the Supreme 
Court's interpretation (Alley 1999, Hitchcock 2004)--prohibits 
state institutions and representatives from financially supporting 
churches and church organizations and publicly exhibiting reli-
gious symbols. After the Second World War in particular, this 
constitutionally rooted stipulation of the separation of church and 
state was enforced with increasing rigor as the number of relig-
ions and philosophies in the US grew-the result partly of immi-
gration, partly of indigenous developments. 
Linked to the strict separation of church and state is the guar-
antee of almost unlimited freedom to practice religion (Choper 
1995; Hammond 1998), largely shielded from intervention by 
state bodies-in the same way that the protection of personal 
freedom is generally at the core of political concepts of order. A 
basic element of American civil religion is that its citizens' scope 
of freedom must be acknowledged and secured as far as possible, 
and that the degree of success in fulfilling this task is the yard-
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stick by which the legitimacy of all exercise of state power is 
measured. The American people's vibrant patriotism draws its 
greatest strength not least from being at home in the "freest land 
on earth" in which everyone can 'be happy according to his own 
countenance.' 
Ideas of civil religion are widespread among the American 
people. In surveys, the majority regularly agrees with statements 
such as "I consider holidays like the Fourth of July religious as 
well as patriotic" and "We should respect the president's author-
ity since his authority is from God" (Wimberley 1976; Wald 
1997, 61; Wilcox 2000, 16-19). 
American presidents make frequent reference in their 
speeches to the specific world of ideas and symbols belonging to 
American civil religion (Germino 1984; Lejon 1988). George 
Washington already applied them when addressing the Congress 
and the American people at his inauguration in 1789: ''No People 
can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand, 
which conducts the Affairs of men more than the People of the 
United States. Every step, by which they have advanced to the 
character of an independent nation, seems to have been distin-
guished by some token of providential agency" (Washington 
1939, 293). 
Such "sermons of civil religion" have frequently been held by 
American presidents since Washington's time. Abraham Lincoln 
and Ronald Reagan in particular were gifted "high priests" of the 
"American creed." Ronald Reagan publicly expressed his con-
viction that the United States was a chosen nation singled out for 
a specific mission: "We are a nation under God. I've always be-
lieved that this blessed land was set apart in a special way, that 
some divine plan placed this great continent between the oceans" 
(quoted from Lejon 1988, 80). 
Terms such as "divine plan," "Providence" and "Creator" are 
part of the standard rhetorical repertoire of American presidents, 
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who are regarded not only as "Head of State" and "Commander 
in Chief," but also as the nation's "Chief Preacher," charged with 
the task of spreading hope and confidence in times of crisis. 
The "preaching" of the forty-third President of the United 
States, George W. Bush, whose speeches are repeatedly peppered 
with scraps of American "civil religion," is no exception. "Lib-
erty is God's gift to every human being in the world ... We're 
called to extend the promise of this country into the lives of 
every citizen who lives here. We're called to defend our nation 
and to lead the world to peace, and we will meet both challenges 
with courage and with confidence" (Bush 2003a). 
When Bush endeavors to speak words of comfort after tragic 
events such as the attacks of September 11 or the Columbia 
space shuttle disaster, he fuses secular and religious rhetoric into 
a whole dominated by a metaphorical style that is active, future-
oriented, and optimistic-in conformity with American civil re-
ligion. Disasters are ultimately only a "test" of America's "reso-
lution" and "will" to proceed down its allotted path of "progress" 
and "liberty." Strengthening "faith," they are at worst mere "set-
backs" on the road to prosperity and "fortune," the price exacted 
for scientific and technological triumph, for military victory, for 
"liberty," etc. Almost every speech by Bush ends-also in accor-
dance with tradition-with the statement "[May] God bless 
America," expressing the hope and confidence that God's bless-
ing rests on the United States. 
Bush is thus merely continuing rhetorical tradition in his 
speeches, which many European observers feel have an unusu-
ally strong "religious" tone. The majority of "religious" refer-
ences and connotations in his current public speeches present 
familiar civil religious ideas in more or less new combinations. 
Bush invokes common values and proffers-in the manner of the 
Roman Republic-the moral convictions of the nation's forefa-
thers ("mos maiorurn") to mobilize support for political inten-
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tions.7 In this respect, his speeches and public addresses are not a 
novel phenomenon. 
European observers nevertheless claim that Bush differs from 
his predecessors by using more religious references and Biblical 
quotations than, say, his father George Herbert Walker Bush or 
William Jefferson Clinton. They point out that Bush begins al-
most every working day in the White House with a Bible read-
ing, opens his Cabinet meetings with a prayer, and frequently 
invites members of the clergy to visit the White House.8 When, 
in the wake of the Columbia disaster at the beginning of Febru-
ary 2003, Bush addressed the shocked nation in a televised 
speech and declared, "The same Creator who names the stars 
also knows the names of the seven souls we mourn today,"9 fol-
lowing this by a direct quotation from the Book of Isaiah; critics 
thought this an unusual move for an American president who 
should represent all American people regardless of their creed. In 
the aftermath of September 11 in particular, when his aim was to 
put fresh heart into the nation and prepare it for the wars in Af-
ghanistan and later in Iraq, Bush increasingly incorporated 
"Christian" terms and ideas into his speeches. It was no coinci-
dence, claim observers, that in his State of the Union address on 
January 28, 2003, Bush justified a preventive strike against Iraq 
by calling on the "loving God" in whom, as he said, the nation 
placed its confidence in these "decisive days" more than ever. 10 
He also referred to liberty as "God's gift to humanity," which the 
7 Keller, Bill . 2003 . "Reagan ' s Son," New York Times Magazine (online), 26 January . 
1 Dempsey, Judy . 2003 . "Solana fears widening gulf between EU and US." Financial 
Times (online), 7 January . Rob, Matthias. 2003. "Der fromme Mann irn Wei6en Haus, " 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 January, p. 3. 
9 Quoted from: Richard W. Stevenson, "Bush Leads Nation's Grieving ," New York Times 
on the Web, 2 February 2003 . 
10 Geyer, Christian . 2003 . "Zwei Stellvertreter Christi," Frankfurter Allg emeine Zeitung, 
30 January, p. 33. 
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American people desired to protect for all the peoples of the 
world (Bush 2003b). A year before this, Bush had spoken of an 
"axis of evil" (Bush 2002c ), deliberately introducing a relig-
iously charged expression in his use of the word "evil" that 
helped to divide the world into "good" and "evil," "friends" and 
"foes." Did not this choice of words-as the critics quoted ear-
lier maintain---<iisclose the "Manichean" attitude of a closet 
"fundamentalist"? 
There is no doubt that since September 11, 2001, Bush's ref-
erences to God have grown more frequent and more fervent 
("loving God," "Lord Almighty," "Giver of life") than in previ-
ous months. The shock of the terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington hit the American people hard and drove many to 
seek refuge in their faith. While it is possible that the President 
also experienced an intensification of religious faith in the period 
after September 11, 2001, social science cannot determine the 
truth of that claim. However, the allegation must be examined 
that Bush developed a "Christian missionary" view of politics 
that increasingly colors his domestic and foreign policy. Admit-
tedly, his speeches contain statements that could be interpreted as 
having Christian Evangelical meanings, such as "the power of 
faith can transform a life" or "it's so inspirational to see ... the 
great works of our Lord in your heart" (Bush 2003a). Such 
statements clearly overstep the normal level of "civil religion" in 
Presidential speeches. However, should they really be read in the 
light of the Protestant "fundamentalism" of which the President 
stands accused by the critics mentioned? ls the domestic and for-
eign policy of the United States under George W. Bush shaped 
by the programmatic positions of American "fundamentalists"? 
Christian Protestant Fundamentalism in the US 
The term "fundamentalism" originated-perhaps surprisingly 
in view of current discussions concerning political developments 
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in Islamic societies-in the US, and denotes a Protestant reform 
movement that arose at the end of the nineteenth and beginning 
of the twentieth century. The name derived from the title of a 12-
volume series of publications that appeared between 1910 and 
1915: The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth. The aim of 
the work was to defend the ''true" faith against "new-fangled" 
theological modernism, 11 theological liberalism, 12 and "secular-
ism" (Darwinism in particular), and also to warn against the 
negative social and cultural changes they were assumed to 
spawn. 
In its initial stages, the new movement was principally sup-
ported by scholars in the urban centers of the North and recog-
nized theological faculties such as Princeton Seminary. From the 
1920s fundamentalism also spread among believers of lower 
socio-economic classes in the South and Midwest. 
Although initially the fundamentalists were still classified as 
part of America's "mainstream," this was to change after the 
"Monkey Trial." The American public reacted with consternation 
to the fundamentalists' proc!amations of anti-rationalism ("We 
study only the Bible") and "fanatical" criticism of modern natu-
ral sciences. As public attitudes became more negative, the fun-
damentalists responded by increasingly retreating into their 
communities and cultivating an escapism that spumed the out-
side world. Many lived in anticipation of the end of the world 
and the imminent Second Coming of Christ. Fundamentalists 
began to found their own schools and colleges and expand their 
11 A reference to the "Gennan," "Biblical" or "Higher Criticism" which had begun to 
apply principles of textual criticism to the Bible as to any ancient document; consetVative 
Protestants held the view that this called into question the divine inspiration and truth of 
the Bible as an authoritative document of faith. 
12 This referred chiefly to the "social gospel" movement, which in the view of conserva-
tive Protestants concentrated too much on social reforms and too little on moral and 
pctsonal ljfc issues,. thus forgetting about "saving souls ." 
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religious organizations and institutions, in order to be capable of 
sustaining and reproducing fundamentalist culture while shielded 
from "modernity" (Bruce 1988, 30-31). 
In the twentieth century, American Protestantism was not the 
only religion to develop a progressively institutionalized, " fun-
damentalist'' wing. Studies conducted as part of the "Fundamen-
talism Project" of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(Marty and Appleby 1991-1995) show that almost all religions 
(Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism etc.) developed funda-
mentalist movements during the twentieth century, which-
despite their many differences-had many elements in common. 
According to Marty and Appleby (1991-1995, vol. 1, 835), 
religious "fundamentalism" is an attitude within religious com-
munities that manifests itself in the form of a strategy applied by 
believers to preserve their distinct group identity when this is 
perceived as being under threat. Identity is secured by the selec-
tive revival of certain "fundamental" dogmas, doctrines and 
practices, by which believers aim to demarcate themselves from 
the cultural milieu of the unconverted and "unredeemed," whom 
they perceive as "enemies of God." Their objective is to "recre-
ate" a hermetic world view that can be applied within a complete 
cognitive explanation of the world as a whole, its nature, and its 
history. The powerful attraction of fundamentalist movements is 
drawn from their claim to absolute truth, conveying "ontological 
security" in a world of pluralist claims to validity and lifestyles. 
Their structure is generally authoritarian and their leadership 
absolutist with a strong moral impetus (Bruce 2000). 
Drawing the line between "fundamentalist" and "non-
fundamentalist" movements within a religion can be difficult. 
"Fundamentalists" are distinguished from "conservative," "tradi-
tionalist" or "orthodox" believers solely by their specific under-
standing of the common doctrines, particularly by the selection 
and interpretation of those principles of faith regarded, and to be 
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regarded, as "fundamental." In this connection, the supernatural 
and eschatological elements of a religion are generally empha-
sized and linked to a dualistic Manichean interpretation of the 
world. The meaning of history is projected onto a person (Hid-
den Imam, Christ, Messiah) or a tendency, at the appearance of 
which "good" (''.justice") ultimately prevails at the end of time 
and evil ("Satan") is swept away forever. The intensity of faith is 
strengthened by repeated predictions that the "last days" will 
dawn in the near future. 
Despite the consequences they hold for society, fundamental-
ist movements are not necessarily political. Riesebrodt (1990) 
joins Max Weber in distinguishing two forms of fundamentalism: 
one of "ruling the world," responding to the conflict between 
religious principles of orientation and a changing social envi-
ronment by attempting to control reality, particularly by sup-
pressing reality that differs from the norm; and one of "fleeing 
from the world," an at least mental withdrawal from the world, 
generally with cultish attributes. Only the first type has the po-
tential for radical politicization. 
American fundamentalism in the first half of the twentieth 
century was a purely religious, largely apolitical movement with 
strong escapist tendencies, expecting changes in those social 
conditions designated as "sinful" to arise from the confessional 
conversion of the individual to the Christian way of life and from 
a retreat from the "secular world," or from the direct intervention 
of Christ (chiliasm), but not as a result of social activism on the 
part of the church, political participation, or intervention by the 
(welfare) state. Attempts to politicize fundamentalism thus failed 
repeatedly between the 1920s and 1960s, and not until the 1970s 
did partial political mobilization of a "Christian Right" take 
place, a reaction to growing protest activities by the liberal new 
social movements, the "counter-culture," and the liberalization of 
abortion law by the United States Supreme Court. 
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The "Christian Right" and American Domestic Policy 
A new phenomenon in the United States was the establish-
ment of political organizations in conservative Protestantism 
such as "Moral Majority," "Religious Roundtable," "Christian 
Voice," and "Concerned Women for America" in the late 1970s 
(Watson 1997; Wilcox 2000), which were founded by fundamen-
talist television and radio preachers (among them Jerry Falwell, 
Timothy LaHaye, and James Robison). From the end of the 
1980s these and other "Christian Right" organizations were in-
creasingly joined by "neo-Evangelicals," "Pentecostals," and 
"Charismatics" (here referred to by the generic term of "Evan-
gelicals"), who do not share the full range of religious convic-
tions of the Protestant "fundamentalists," but support their 
political aims. 
These political aims primarily constitute the implementation 
of socio-moral and religio-political reforms such as the rein-
statement of morning prayers in schools, addressing Biblical 
creationism in biology lessons, and a strict ban on abortions-
reforms intended to arrest or reverse the process of social mod-
ernization and socio-cultural liberalization that had been acceler-
ating since the 1960s. 
Surveys show that around 27% of the American population 
can be categorized as Evangelical Protestants (around one-
quarter of whom, approximately 7% of the total population, are 
Protestant "fundamentalists" in the strictest sense) (Wald 1997, 
173). In surveys, Evangelicals claim more frequently than other 
Protestants or Catholics that religion is an important area of ori-
entation in their lives; they are more active in their church com-
munities, attend services more frequently, and read the Bible 
more often than other Christians (Wilcox 2000, 48-49). 
On political issues, Evangelicals adopt considerably more 
conservative positions than adherents of other religions, demon-
strating extremely conservative attitudes to issues of religious 
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policy, and social and moral issues in particular. Surveys show 
they are less willing to tolerate others with diverging values and 
more likely to regard belief in God as an important prerequisite 
for being a "good American." On issues of abortion, the role of 
women in society and homosexual rights, the gap between Evan-
gelicals and "mainline" Protestants, Catholics and those with no 
religious affiliations is relatively wide, while differences are less 
marked on economic questions (Wilcox 2000, 50-51). 
While not all Evangelicals support or favor the organizations 
of the "Christian Right" and their aims, around 14 to 17% of all 
American voters can be classified as supporters of the "Christian 
Right," voting almost exclusively for Republican candidates 
(Green 2000a; Green 2000b; Wilcox 2002, 116-117).13 This is 
the source of the significant influence exerted since the 1980s by 
the "Christian Right" of the Republican Party. The "Christian 
Right" thus associated its great hopes of a radical political 
change and the realization of its catalog of political demands 
with George W. Bush's assumption of office in January 2001. 
In fact, Bush began to accommodate the expectations of the 
"Christian Right" soon after his election. He reinstated the 
"Mexico City Policy" canceling US financial aid for interna-
tional family planning organizations that perform abortions, 
which had been abolished by Clinton in 1993. He ordered a re-
appraisal of state subsidies for medical research institutes using 
embryonic stem cells in their work.14 He announced the intro-
duction of education vouchers also redeemable at (Evangelical) 
parochial schools. He proposed a future program of "faith-based 
13 At the end of the I 990s, the number of activists was between 150,000 and 200,000 (cf. 
Green 2000a : 8). 
1
' On August 9, 2001, Bush decided to grant State aid only to research on existing stem 
cell lines, a decision that provoked divided opinions on "Christian Right" sites, which 
called for an end to federal funding . 
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initiatives" (which later failed due to congressional opposition). 
In addition, he publicly announced his support for morning 
prayers in public schools, for abstinence education, and for a 
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex-marriages, for the 
prohibition of certain forms of late-term abortion, and the prohi-
bition of therapeutic and reproductive cloning. He nominated 
staunch opponents of Roe v. Wade as federal appellate judges. 
Furthermore, he appointed a Pentecostal, John Ashcroft, former 
Senator of Missouri, as Attorney General: Ashcroft's appoint-
ment in particular was to be understood as a quid pro quo for the 
support of the "Christian Right" during the election, prompting 
expectations for the future of closer cooperation between the 
White House and the religio-conservative wing of the GOP on 
issues of domestic policy. 
However, for Bush the "Christian Right" is only one of sev-
eral key blocks of voters. To secure reelection in 2004, he will 
need to satisfy other voter groups in the Republican Party such 
as the economic conservatives, who are more interested in re-
forms in economic, fiscal, and social policy. Since these voter 
groups frequently also hold moderate or liberal views on socio-
moral and religious policy issues, the President's scope for ac-
commodating the demands of the "Christian Right" is strictly 
curtailed. He will thus continue-while making smaller conces-
sions on some socially less controversial issues-to temporize 
and obfuscate on key issues for the "Christian Right," since 
adopting over-definite positions would lose him votes from other 
voting groups. Up to now, then, Bush has deliberately refrained 
from launching initiatives to prohibit abortion by Constitutional 
amendment or to ease the strict separation of church and state. 
He is basically acting no differently from Ronald Reagan, who 
supported individual initiatives by the "Christian Right" in the 
1980s but invested little political capital in launching radical 
changes. Reagan's verbal support of the aims of the "Christian 
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Right" was largely motivated by election strategy, as was his 
occasional use of evangelical-fundamentalist terms such as his 
description of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." 
George W. Bush is following in the footsteps of Ronald 
Reagan, whose successful reelection in 1984 was due not least to 
support from this circle. Bush's constant reiteration that he grew 
up in one of the Bible Belt states (although born in Connecticut), 
converted to Methodism and was "born again," are all aimed at 
increasing his credibility among conservative Protestants, whose 
votes are vital in the 2004 Presidential elections to boost his 
chances of success and prevent a repetition of the close call that 
occurred in the year 2000. 
This is why Bush is so definite in his use of the language of 
Evangelicalism, referring to the "axis of evil," describing the 
protection of freedom as the American "mission" or warning of 
the dangers of a nuclear "Armageddon" (Bush 2002a). While as 
a "born-again Christian" he may have a personal affinity with the 
religio-theological positions of the spiritual leaders of the "Chris-
tian Right," from a political !)Oint of view his strategy is in the 
main an attempt motivated by election tactics to integrate evan-
gelical voters as fully as possible into the circle of regular Re-
publican voters, by the use of rhetoric and token gestures over 
issues of domestic policy. This is demonstrated not least by the 
fact that the President tends to accommodate "Christian Right" 
interests to a far lesser extent in matters of foreign policy-
seldom a critical factor in US election results. 
The "Christian Right" and American Foreign Policy 
During the twenty years and more of its existence, the de-
mands of the "Christian Right" have primarily concerned domes-
tic policy, only rarely taking a stance on foreign policy issues. 
Even after the attacks of September 11, the movement's leaders 
initially attempted to exploit events to galvanize domestic policy 
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into action. Jerry Falwell, former spokesman of the "Moral Ma-
jority ," stated in a television interview two days after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11 that they had been caused by the wrath 
of God, punishing the United States of America for its "sins" (i. e., 
homosexuality, abortion, and feminism). Yet his attempt to adver-
tise the movement's own domestic policy agenda by applying 
this interpretation misfired; massive public protests ensued and 
Falwell was forced to apologize for his remarks. 15 
However, when the United States launched military opera-
tions against the Taliban in Afghanistan, fundamentalist leaders 
began to turn their attention towards foreign policy. Their propa-
ganda now portrayed America-as in the times of the East-West 
conflict-as the "last great home of faith" that had become the 
target of "Satan." The Soviet Union was replaced by Islam(ism) 
as the new "kingdom of evil." Their supporters gratefully seized 
on the idea; Muslims had, after all, long been regarded as a threat 
to the state of Israel, the existence of which plays an important 
role in Protestant fundamentalist eschatology. 16 
This new interpretation of the "fight of good against evil" re-
sulted in unequivocally clear propaganda: "Muhammad was a 
demon-possessed pedophile," declared Jerry Vines, an ex-
president of the Southern Baptist Convention. "Islam is a very 
evil and wicked religion," announced Franklin Graham, son of 
15 Carlson, Peter . 2001. "Jerry Falwell ' s Awkward Apology," Washington Post, 18 No-
vember, FI . 
16 For fundamentalists Israel, said to be the location of"Annageddon," will be the site of 
the "last great battle" against the Anti-Christ. The foundation of the state of Israel in 
1948, and the conquest of Jerusalem by Israeli troops in the Six Days' War, are regarded 
by Evangelical premillenialists as a "sign " of the imminent fulfillment of Biblical prophe-
cies . They have thus demanded for years that the state of Israel be defended by all means 
and Jerusalem recognized as part of Israeli territory . But their most recent demand is the 
destruction of "ungodly Babylon" from which-according to their interpretation of the 
Scriptures-the Anti-Christ will extend his rule. Babylon is sited in today's Iraq, and was 
rebuilt only a few years ago under Saddam Hussein . 
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Billy Graham (NBC Nightly News, November 16, 2001). "Islam 
seeks to destroy others" stated Marion "Pat" Robertson, founder 
of the "Christian Coalition," 17 who said elsewhere that Moham-
med "was an absolute wild-eyed fanatic. He was a robber and a 
brigand ... to think that this is a peaceful religion is fraudulent." 18 
"Adolf Hitler was bad," he continued, "but what the Muslims 
want to do to the Jews is worse." 19 
When the "Christian Coalition," the largest organization of 
the "Christian Right" with 1.5 million members, organized a 
symposium in Washington in February 2003 on the theme "Mus-
lims and The Judeo-Christian World-Where to From Here?," at 
which-as critics pointed out-not a single Muslim was invited 
to speak,20 the hostility to Islam inherent to the event was clearly 
revealed in the choice of topics: "War on Iraq," "Christian Perse-
cution in Arab Countries," and "Islam and Terrorism." Another 
objective of the event, according to information given by the or-
ganizers, was to inform American Christians about the "true"-
in other words, the violent, anti-Christian-"nature oflslam." 
The "Christian Coalition" had sent a questionnaire to its 
members prior to the conference to investigate their attitude to-
ward Islam. Almost 90% of those participating in this online sur-
vey (n=955) shared the view that Islam was not a "religion of 
peace;" 91.5% believed that Islam was not a "Godly religion" 
17 Quoted from Susan Sachs, "Baptist Pastor Attacks Islam, Inciting Cries of Intoler-
ance," New York Times on the Web, 15 June 2002 . 
18 Thus Marion "Pat" Robertson in the TV show "Hannity & Colmes,» Fox News Chan-
nel; quoted here from a press release of the Muslim Amen ·can Society dated IO October 
2002. 
19 Quoted from Dana Milbank, "Hawks Chide Bush over Islam," Washington Post 
(online), 2 December 2002. 
20 Interfaith Alliance President Says Upcoming Christian Coalition Forum Raises Serious 
Questions About its Spirit and Purpose. Interfaith Alliance Press Release, 12 February 
2003; http://www.interfaithalliance .org/press/. 
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and 96% believed that Christians were discriminated against in 
Islamic societies-unlike Muslims in Christian societies. 21 With 
an eye to the Iraq crisis , the survey revealed that 75% were in 
favor of war against Saddam Hussein-twenty percentage points 
more than in the population as a whole at that time (Szu-
kala/Jager 2003, 44) . 
Although Iraq policies delivered such definite support for the 
President's position, there are no grounds for concluding that 
George W. Bush would pursue the religiously colored world 
view and apocalyptic prophecies of a Pat Robertson, Jerry Fal-
well, and their ilk, or align his foreign policy to such views. On 
the contrary, Bush explicitly distanced himself several times 
from their tirades against Islam, earning their harsh criticism in 
retum .22 
Bush's statements were marked by his attempt to achieve four 
different goals: (1) avoid alienating his Evangelical voters while 
maintaining a tone of moderation; (2) by doing this, to prevent 
the development of pan-Islamic solidarity with the Taliban, 
Osama Bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein after the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq; (3) attempt to forge a broadly based war 
and anti-terrorism coalition to include moderate Islamic states 
(Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait etc.; but also Pakistan and Uz-
bekistan , for example, with regard to the war in Afghanistan); ( 4) 
ensure that, despite his bellicose rhetoric, no danger would ensue 
for the Muslim minority in his own country. Of the four to six 
million Muslims in the US, not a few had been the victims of 
21 However, 77% of the survey's participants openly admitted to knowing "little" or 
"nothing" about Islam: Christian Coalition Releases Survey Results on Islam. Press Re-
lease, January 17, 2003 : http ://cc.org/becomeinfonned/pressreJeaseOJ 1703.html . 
22 
"Bush Steps Away From Christian Fundamentalists ' Comments on Islam" In Ethics 
Daily.com, November 15, 2002; httpJ/www.ethicsdaily.com/article_detail.cfm?A.ID=l8J2. 
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verbal or physical attacks after September 11, and at least three 
had been murdered.23 
In his addresses, Bush consistently omitted all expressions as-
sociated with the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1996) that 
would only have played into the hands of Islamic (and Protes-
tant) fundamentalists and provoked a "clash within civilizations" 
at home. He did all he could to present the fight against al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban as a "battle against international terrorism"-an 
anti-religious, because inhuman, movement-and backed up his 
verbal articulation of this stance with symbolic acts of state: Af-
ter September 11, multi-denominational services were held in 
New York, attended by a phalanx of non-Christian clergy and 
religious scholars (including those of Jewish, Islamic, and Hindu 
origins), at which George W. Bush's 'sermons' were invariably 
from the mold of civil, not denominational religion.24 
Statements by the President that transparently served the 
needs of his own Evangelical voters ("axis of evil" etc.) re-
mained the exception. The central, reiterated concepts addressed 
in his speeches were "terrorism," not "religion," "al-Qaeda" and 
"the Taliban regime," not "Islam," and "lasting freedom," not 
"global peace"-which, like "infinite justice," could have been 
interpreted in a Christian missionary light. "The terrorists," 
stated Bush, 
practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been re-
jected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim 
clerics-a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teach-
ings of Islam .... Islam's teachings are good and peaceful, 
and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme 
the name of Allah. The terrorists are traitors to their own 
faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself .. .. They are the 
23 Silk, Mark . 2002. "Our Muslim Neighbors," Religion in the News, 513: I, 22. 
24 Silk, Mark. 2001 . "The Civil Religion Goes to War," Religion in the News, 4/3 : I . 
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heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth cen-
tury ... they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and 
totalitarianism (Bush 2001). 
Behind this carefully chosen rhetoric was the US govern-
ment's realization that Huntington's theory of an imminent 
"clash of civilizations," which has been adopted by American 
(and Islamic) fundamentalists as a confirmation of their Mani-
chean world view, can easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy 
as a result of the government's own words and deeds. 
George W. Bush's Foreign Policy and the Iraq Conflict 
The foreign policy of Bush's government is influenced not by 
representatives of the "fundamentalist" "Christian Right" but by 
neo- and standard conservative advisers that, like Rumsfeld, 
Cheney, Rice, Wolfowitz and Perle, had already served under 
earlier Republican presidents (Bush, Ford, and Reagan). None is 
a Protestant fundamentalist or Evangelical. Attorney General 
John Ashcroft, an avowed supporter of the "Christian Right," has 
no perceptible influence on the formulation of US foreign policy. 
The attitude of the President's foreign policy advisers is 
shaped by a deep distrust of international organizations such as 
the United Nations and a profoundly skeptical view of multilat-
eral action that could curtail American sovereignty or potentially 
damage American (security) interests. 
While these views are represented in part by the "Christian 
Right," they are primarily shared by conservative think tanks in 
particular (such as the American Enterprise Institute and the 
Center for Security Policy), as well as other security policy ad-
visers and Republican senators. Current United States' foreign 
and security policies are formulated against a backdrop of (neo-) 
conservative convictions, not Christian fundamentalist dogmas. 
However, European critics in particular cling to the convic-
tion that the "preventive strike" against Iraq, a controversial 
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move in terms of both morality and international law, was ulti-
mately religiously motivated and demonstrated belief in a "mis-
sion." After all, Bush himself had described the US's God-given 
mission as being "to defend our nation and lead the world to 
peace" (Bush 2003a), exhibiting-according to one German 
journalist-the nature of salvation: "The ambition to protect that 
Bush expresses is one of totality, encompassing, so to speak, the 
evil of all generations. Though the Kingdom of God has not yet 
materialized, yet it has dawned at that time in 2003 when a lone 
president takes the evil of the world upon himself and, acting as 
others' proxy, comes, sees and conquers. "25 
It is certainly correct that in the weeks leading up to the war 
against Iraq, Bush increasingly applied the rhetoric of (civil!) 
religion, with the aim of mobilizing support for his cause at 
home. However, there are no grounds for the proposition that his 
motives for planning the invasion were specifically denomina-
tional Christian, given the array of realpolitik-related reasons 
from the US point of view which advocated military intervention 
in Iraq (Pollack 2002). As early as October 7, 2002, President 
Bush had stated 
Some believe we can address this danger by simply resum-
ing the old approach to inspections, and applying diplomatic 
and economic pressure. Yet this is precisely what the world 
has tried to do since 1991. The UN inspections program was 
met with systematic deception. The Iraqi regime bugged ho-
tel rooms and offices of inspectors to find where they were 
going next; they forged documents, destroyed evidence, and 
developed mobile weapons facilities to keep a step ahead of 
inspectors (Bush 2002b). 
25 Geyer, Christian . 2003. "Zwei Stellvertreter Christi," Frankforter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
30 January, p. 33. 
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At the start of 2003, the US government claimed that Iraq had 
failed to fulfill Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002, in addi-
tion to 16 earlier resolutions, and that Iraq had evaded sanctions 
imposed on it, used bogus companies to procure material for its 
weapons program and financed the material with illegal oil reve-
nues that it had boosted from 500 million dollars to three billion 
dollars within only a few years.26 The government also claimed 
that Iraq had failed to meet its obligations to disarm and to dis-
close data concerning its arsenals of biological and chemical 
weapons of mass destruction and their stockpile locations; that it 
had attempted to develop nuclear weapons; that it possessed mis-
sile systems exceeding 150 km in range, also expressly forbidden 
by UN resolution (Resolution 687); furthermore, the claims con-
tinued, links between Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist network 
existed which-as Colin Powell declared before the UN security 
council-were said to have been established by Abu Mussab al-
Zarqawi . There was a danger that Iraq could supply terrorist 
networks with biological or chemical war substances such as 
anthrax, botulin, ricin or VX nerve gas (already used once by 
Saddam Hussein against Iran and his own Kurdish populati on). 
The Bush administration considered these grounds sufficient 
to justify a military strike against Iraq and effect a regime 
change. Any attempt to read further "intrinsic" factors such as 
religious motives ("Protestant fundamentalism") into its conclu-
sion must-as this analysis has shown-be rejected as pure 
speculation. While motives of "civil religion" are involved in the 
question of the legitimacy of the Iraq war and its "aftermath," the 
principal aim behind the persistent affirmation of wanting to help 
the repressed Iraqi people topple a tyrannical regime and intro-
duce "freedom" and "democracy" was to mobilize support in 
26 Rice, Condoleezza. 2003. "Ein Konsens zum Stillhalten ist fllr uns nicht akzeptabel." 
Frankfort er Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 February, p. 3. 
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Bush's own country (since Vietnam, the United States has obvi-
ously been unable to wage war without gaining public support). 
But a distinction must be drawn between this rhetoric of "civil 
religion" and the rhetoric of denominational religion. Unlike the 
latter, the former generated a self-imposed political obligation to 
arrange for the rebuilding of the country and democratic order 
after the successful conclusion of the Iraq war, regardless of the 
cost and duration of the undertaking. The Bush government has 
no choice but to permit itself to be judged by this implicit obliga-
tion-particularly at home-since the Iraq war is over. The vast 
scale of the task is likely to prove a tough test of the United 
States' "missionary zeal" for democracy. 
CONCLUSION 
To many observers, the forty-third President of the US, 
George W. Bush, appears more religious than his predecessors. 
While this may be true for him as an individual, his policies 
show no such influence by personal religious beliefs. Like his 
role model Ronald Reagan, Bush is first and foremost a political 
"professional," and is advised by political "professionals" such 
as Karl Rove, the election strategist. Bush seeks to win the sup-
port of as many societal groups in the US as possible, not least 
with a view to securing his reelection in 2004. To do this, he re-
quires the support of the "Christian Right" wing of his own 
party, among others (but by no means exclusively). He thus ac-
commodates the domestic policy demands issued by this wing, at 
least where he can do this without losing the support of other 
voting blocs, and therefore occasionally takes over the rhetorical 
terminology of Evangelicals, particularly when speaking before 
an Evangelical audience. Bush's statements quoted at the begin-
ning, "the power of faith can transform a life" or "it's so inspira-
tional to see . .. the great works of our Lord in your heart" (Bush 
2003a) were made to the "National Religious Broadcasters," an 
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organization of Evangelical radio and TV broadcasters in the 
USA that plays a key role as disseminator in Bush's election 
strategy. Reagan also adopted this style of speaking at the begin-
ning of the 1980s whenever he appeared at the organization's 
conferences. 
However, the "Christian Right" plays no role in the formula-
tion of foreign policy, in which the government's actions are in-
fluenced by (neo-) conservative advisers, whose viewpoints and 
objectives reveal motives of security policy, strategy and eco-
nomics, but not religion. No other interpretation of the Presi-
dent's statements and speeches is possible. Bush's choice of 
religious metaphors remains in the category of American "civil 
religion," expressing a commitment to the ideals of democracy 
and human rights-intended to derive their effectiveness not 
from the use of force and hegemonial expansion, but from their 
own role model. Even under Bush, American politics has not 
adopted the tenor of using military methods to export the coun-
try's own social model throughout the world: "America has no 
empire to extend or utopia to establish," declared Bush in 2002 
to the cadets of West Point Military Academy (Bush 2002a). 
The foreign policy of George W. Bush, then, is less concerned 
with a change of direction motivated by religion ( or even Chris-
tianity) than with a stricter perception of American (security) 
interests prompted by the events of September 11, and a stronger 
articulation of the ideas and "beliefs" of "civil religion": "We 
have no intention of imposing our culture-but America will 
always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dig-
nity: the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for 
women, private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious 
tolerance" (Bush 2002c ). Historically, these "beliefs" of civil 
religion that oblige every political order to protect peace and 
freedom and guarantee equal opportunity, the rule of law and 
democracy, have primarily served to determine the moral yard-
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stick by which the citizens of the United States can gauge the 
legitimacy of their own government's political actions-and pro-
nounce judgment on Election Day. 
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